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Liberal representative democracies require a lot from their elections. Most 
obviously, the declaration of a result gives an at least temporary answer to deeply 
contested arguments about who should be in charge of the nation’s lawmaking 
and governing institutions. This dispute settlement function involves translating 
individual votes into representational outcomes. Doing so may be apparently 
straightforward (as with first-past-the-post voting) or so deeply complicated that 
only a handful of ‘preference whisperers’ really seem to know how it works (as 
with the above-the-line/group vote ticket system used in conjunction with the 
single transferable vote for elections to Australia’s Senate). And, of course, 
choosing representatives by way of voting may then be just the first step in 
apportioning lawmaking and governmental power, as with the process of 
coalition negotiation that regularly occurs in nations with proportional 
representation electoral systems in place.1 
This ‘votes into representational outcomes’ aspect of elections obviously is 
very important. There is a large amount of literature on the different ways that 
the translation can take place, as well as on the consequences for a nation’s 
governing processes of choosing one voting process over another.2 It is an issue 
that, on occasion, grips a nation’s political class, and can even excite the general 
public. Current debates over reform of the voting system used to fill seats in 
Australia’s Senate illustrate the former, while New Zealand’s referendums on 
electoral reform in 1992–93 (but less so in 2011) are an example of the latter.3 
When such debates arise, the focus inevitably tends to be on who will win and 
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who will lose as the result of any proposed change.4 Insofar as elected politicians 
have any say over what the methods used to give them power look like, partisan 
considerations will never be far away. And the voting public, too, will not be 
insensible to the likely political outcomes of tinkering with (much less drastically 
reworking) their country’s electoral system. Nevertheless, interacting with such 
calculations are deeper questions about the form that the nation’s government 
should take. Is it better to have strong, stable single-party governments that may 
be elected by less than a majority of the population, or highly representative, 
fractured governments that closely reflect the voting public’s expressed 
preferences? Should individual representatives be closely responsive to the 
demands and judgments of the immediate voters who elected them, or should 
party cohesion and unity be the primary goal? As different electoral systems are 
more or less likely to produce each outcome, a choice has to be made about what 
is the ‘best’ form of government for the country to have in place.5 
However, settling the ‘who rules here’ question is but one purpose that an 
electoral system fulfils. It ultimately may be what an election is for, but it 
certainly is not all that an election is about. Rather, the rules that govern a 
nation’s elections and the practices that occur during them tell a host of stories 
and carry a plethora of meanings. Some of these emerge out of what one of the 
contributors to the thematic component of this Issue, Graeme Orr, has previously 
called the ‘ritual and rhythm’ of elections.6 The very manner in which we cast 
our ballots, the places we vote in, the rules governing polling place behaviour, 
the set timetable of proceedings and so on establish elections as a set of recurrent, 
ritualised proceedings that ‘simultaneously represent, and play out, certain values 
and social meanings’.7 Seen through this lens, electoral processes are not just a 
technocratic or instrumental means of mechanically translating individual 
preferences into representational outcomes. They, instead, are an important 
avenue for generating a collective social experience that can help bind the 
political community together. In this way, the existence of electoral rituals and 
rhythms underpins the system’s role as an at least temporary resolver of political 
disagreement. For this reason, we need to see elections as more than just the 
chance to cast a vote: how, why, where and when we do so can matter just as 
much. 
Then, there are normative judgments that deliberately are inserted into a 
nation’s electoral rules as a form of what Mark Tushnet has called ‘constitutional 
expressivism’; that is, ‘a way of understanding [a nation’s people] as political 
beings’.8 For example, decisions about who may (and who may not) vote at an 
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election are an important means of signalling membership of a nation’s political 
community. Laws controlling the use of money to try and influence the election 
outcome, or restraining the form that political communication may take during an 
election campaign, demonstrate a national commitment to a particular way of 
making collective decisions.9 Restrictions on the types of parties that may contest 
an election, as found in places such as Turkey, Spain and Belgium, send an 
explicit message about the kind of political future that each polity finds 
unacceptable.10 When a society is deciding whether and how to regulate such 
matters, it is making fundamental value judgments about the manner in which it 
should self-govern. Those value judgments may then differ markedly from those 
adopted by other liberal representative democracies – witness, for example, the 
very different regulatory regimes that apply to political financing in the United 
States and Canada,11 or the contrasting treatment of prisoner voting rights in New 
Zealand and Denmark.12 Such differences then speak to national character; they 
are a way of signalling that in this place, this is how we think we ought to govern 
ourselves. 
Because a nation’s electoral law encompasses all of these aspects, it is 
constitutional law at its most literal; it constitutes the relevant polity and sets the 
terms by which it then both governs and is governed. Furthermore, the various 
purposes that an election serves make the field of electoral law a rich one in 
which to till. It lends itself easily to cross-disciplinary study, reaching into the 
fields of politics,13 sociology,14 economics15 and even marketing,16 psychology17 
and philosophy.18  The very wide range of differing practices amongst liberal 
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representative democracies cries out for comparative examination.19 Electoral law 
is thus perfectly suited to just the sort of thematic collection that the Editor has 
brought together in this Issue’s pages. The range and quality of the contributions 
also are exemplary and attest to a vibrant scholarly community studying these 
matters in Australia. This is to be welcomed, as the perspective of United States’ 
scholars traditionally has dominated the electoral law field. Establishing a 
distinctively Australian focus on the subject thus is an important step in 
strengthening and broadening it in a truly international way.  
There are five papers in this thematic collection, contributed by nine different 
authors. The first contribution, provided by Graeme Orr and Ron Levy, looks at 
an increasingly pressing issue in all democracies: the ever-expanding polling of 
voters’ intentions in the lead-up to an election. They do so from what I will call a 
‘pro-deliberation’ perspective, in that they believe voters ought to decide how to 
vote based on ‘an exchange of reasons in which participants persuade each other 
based on what Habermas termed the “force of the better argument.”’ Viewed 
through this lens, Orr and Levy identify four ‘pathologies’ in relation to intention 
polling: it turns elections into a ‘horse race’ in which discussion of substantive 
issues is sidelined; it may influence final outcomes by encouraging tactical 
voting; it causes representatives to focus less on the long-term common good and 
more on the immediate demands of the median voter; and, it is open to 
manipulation by politicians, lobbyists and an activist media seeking their own 
political outcomes. To combat such dangers, some degree of polling regulation 
may therefore be required. Orr and Levy then examine where such regulation has 
been applied and the judicial response when it is challenged on the grounds that it 
limits constitutionally-protected freedom of speech rights. Their conclusion is 
that the judicial response generally has been too quick to adopt a simplistic view 
that voters ought to be able to access opinion poll information if they wish to and 
insufficiently open to the deliberative benefits of removing it as an influence 
during the election campaign. Consequently, they advocate a ban on publishing 
the results of ‘pure electoral opinion polling’ (but not ‘issues-based opinion 
polling’) during the election campaign period. 
Narelle Miragliotta and Zim Nwokora examine what they call a ‘secondary’ 
electoral law – the provisions designed to ‘save’ ballots that have been completed 
other than in accordance with the instructions given to voters. Such savings 
provisions, which permit a vote to count despite some failure to meet formal 
requirements, are common in liberal representative democracies as the result of 
two presumptions. The first is that an election result should, as far as possible, 
accurately reflect the preferences of those who voted. The second is that, as far as 
possible, the expressed preference of every voter ought to be treated equally. 
Therefore, a failure to strictly adhere to formal requirements when marking the 
ballot paper should not in and of itself lead to the substantive outcome of the vote 
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being cast aside. However, as Miragliotta and Nwokora explain, savings 
provisions designed to avoid this consequence may be broad (in that they permit 
informal votes to be counted whenever the voter’s intent is discernable) or 
enumerated (in that they identify only certain specific errors that will not in 
themselves render the vote invalid). Their article then explores whether the sort 
of voting system a nation adopts determines the form of savings provision put 
into place in a simple cause and effect manner. They find this explanation 
insufficient, however, and instead provide an in-depth historical review of how 
Australia’s federal voting systems and savings provisions have developed in 
tandem. This review leads them to posit a broader theory regarding the manner in 
which secondary electoral laws, such as savings provisions, evolve in response to 
changes to primary electoral laws that are adopted primarily for partisan political 
purposes. 
Orr and Levy’s concerns about the information used when making electoral 
decisions find an echo in the article by Paul Kildea and Rodney Smith. They 
focus on the concept of ‘informed voting’ in relation to referendums, which are a 
requisite feature of constitutional change in Australia. After exploring how the 
sorts of information a voter may require differs between representative elections 
and referendums, Kildea and Smith outline three conceptions of how voters can 
become informed about the issues involved in a referendum. The first involves 
voters independently assessing information about the referendum issues and 
forming their own views on the matter. The second involves the use of a heuristic 
technique such as reliance on the views of ‘trusted information sources that have 
proved good predictors of their positions on past political issues’. Finally, voters 
may answer the referendum question based on a judgment about its proposer 
rather than the issue itself. Of the three, it is clear that Kildea and Smith believe 
the first ‘independent thinker’ model is most desirable, as they then examine how 
present legal regulation of the referendum process in Australia enables (or, 
rather, fails to enable) it to take effect. Their article then looks to available 
empirical evidence, including evidence from the authors’ own focus group 
studies, on how well informed voters are in fact about referendums issues, before 
concluding with some reform proposals to help improve this state of affairs. 
Electoral law’s role in defining a political community forms the basis for 
Alexander Reilly and Tiziana Torresi’s contribution. They make an argument 
that voting rights in Australia should be expanded from adult citizens to 
encompass adult permanent residents as well. While only a few other countries 
have such liberal franchise rules in place – New Zealand being the exemplar 
nonpareil – Reilly and Torresi claim that it would fit both with the compulsory 
nature of voting in Australia and the nation’s history of progressive electoral 
reform. After reviewing the approach of the High Court of Australia, they 
conclude that there is no impediment to including non-citizens amongst those 
electors who exercise the powers of ‘the people’ under the Australian 
Constitution. Indeed, a variety of theoretical approaches to defining who should 
participate in deciding matters of collective concern point in favour of including 
non-citizens who have the right to reside permanently in a polity. Reilly and 
Torresi conclude by addressing some specific flow-on concerns from 
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enfranchising permanent residents at federal elections, such as whether it would 
undermine the status of citizenship and the implications for other democratic 
processes of the state. 
The final contribution from Elisa Arconi continues the theme of exclusion 
and inclusion by examining how elections and matters of electoral law are 
absolutely central to the Australian constitutional order. The Australian 
Constitution speaks in terms of ‘the people’ as constituting the Commonwealth 
of Australia and then exercising ongoing powers in the structures of 
representative government thereafter. However, as Arconi notes, the entire 
Australian people have not in practice exercised this role; rather, it is only those 
recognised as ‘electors’ who have done so. She then traces how these two 
concepts – the people and electors – have increasingly merged over time, 
focusing on the inclusion of women over time as fully equal members of the 
polity. That merging then has important consequences for the power of 
legislatures to act in ways that remove or dilute voting rights. Arconi examines a 
series of High Court decisions that have invalidated electoral legislation which 
sought to define who is an elector and how they may participate in elections on 
the basis that the law fails to accord ‘the people’ an adequate choice regarding 
who will represent them. In doing so, the Court has created a ratchet effect in 
relation to electoral law, whereby legislatures may expand the range of groups 
recognised as electors far more easily than they may constrict them. Arconi then 
turns to examine whether this approach may have implications for limits on the 
federal parliament’s power to amend the grounds for citizenship, including a 
postscript that addresses recent legislation that does just this. 
As already noted, these five contributions superbly demonstrate the breadth 
and depth of electoral law as a stand-alone field. They provoke much thought and 
I hope they will serve as a prompt for further investigative scholarship. I 
commend the UNSW Law Journal and its Editor for their efforts in putting this 
themed collection together, and the authors for their contributions to it. As we 
say in New Zealand, ka pai. 
 
 
 
